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ABSTRACT. Using country-level data from 2000-2013, 
we test the relationship between life satisfaction 
(measured as how people evaluate their life as a whole 
rather than their current feelings) and the motivation to 
work (measured as aggregate hours of work). Our 
hypothesis is that even after controlling for average labor 
income tax rates in countries with high and low average 
hours worked, there is a significant negative association 
between the motivation to work and life satisfaction. The 
main findings of this paper are that the increase in the 
motivation to work per employee comes at the expense 
of life satisfaction, and differences in average tax rates on 
labor income cannot account for differences in time 
allocation. Once life satisfaction is included, the 
hypotheses of previous neoclassical economic studies are 
almost irrelevant in determining the response of market 
hours to higher average tax rates on labor income. In line 
with our assumption, we find a negative relationship 
between life satisfaction and the motivation to work in the 
cross-country examinations. In countries with the highest 
hours worked (Hungary, Estonia), wealth is generally 
preferred to leisure and in countries with the lowest hours 
worked (France, Germany), leisure is preferred to wealth. 
JEL Classification: H20, J01, 
J29 
Keywords: motivation to work, labor supply, labor taxes, life 
satisfaction. 
 
Introduction 
 
Nowadays, there are huge differences between Americans and Europeans in how the 
motivation to work changes in the labor market. In the 1990s, the average weekly working 
hours started to fall in Europe, whereas Americans started to work more. Using the average 
number of weekly hours of work data from the European Statistics database (Eurostat, 2017) 
and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2017a), we found 
that, in 2014, Americans worked 38.6 hours per week in market work (defined as paid time). 
For example, in the same year, the average number of weekly hours of market work by French 
workers was 34.4. The comparison between Germany and the United States is similar. 
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However, the average weekly working hours were not the same in the early 1970s. 
Decomposing the weekly hours worked per worker into the weekly hours worked per person, 
we can observe that Americans were working fewer hours per person, 23.5 per week, on 
average, while the average number of hours working per person was 24.4 per week in France 
(see Prescott, 2004; McGrattan and Rogerson, 2004; Hallam and Weber, 2007; for details). 
Previous studies have tried to find answers to the question, “Why are there differences in the 
motivation to work between countries and why did it change after the 1970s?” Using cultural 
differences to answer this question when comparing the United States and European countries 
is dubious. Around the time of World War I, the motivation to work was lower in the United 
States than in France and Germany (Huberman, 2004). Then, the motivation to work started to 
decline in Europe, and by the late 1960s, it was almost the same in the United States and Europe 
(Huberman, 2004). The aforementioned fluctuations in the history of hours worked shows that 
simply comparing the motivation to work between the United States and Europe is 
inappropriate and much remains to be clarified. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
work on the effect of taxes on the motivation to work that examines and compares Continental 
Europe with Eastern Europe. 
Finding deterministic factors influencing the motivation to work has been the subject of 
intense debate in recent international economic literature. To the best of our knowledge, except 
for Alesina et al. (2005), most of the papers in this area pay little or no attention to life 
satisfaction when explaining the motivation to work (Prescott, 2004; Faggio and Nickell, 2007; 
Rogerson, 2007; Ohanian et al., 2008; Olovsson, 2009; Berger and Heylen, 2011). Our aim in 
this paper to examine the explanatory power of two factors, average labor income tax rates and 
life satisfaction, on the motivation to work in Continental and Eastern Europe. The main 
question we are trying to answer is why the motivation to work in France and Germany fell 
dramatically, but stayed relatively stable in Hungary and Estonia (see Table 1, below). 
In Table 1, we introduce a picture of both weekly and annual hours worked. The 
interesting point is that there is much variation in annual hours worked compared to weekly 
hours worked (see Causa, 2009; Chapter 3 in OECD, 2008 for more details). Therefore, one 
should also be cautious when interpreting the results, as the effect of taxation or other regulatory 
policies can be overestimated/underestimated due to different measures of dependent variables 
on hours worked (Causa, 2009). In the empirical model of the present paper, we will refer to 
the annual hours worked to capture the cross-country differences on work motivation along the 
intensive margin. To the best of our knowledge, until now only three scholarly works (Faggio 
and Nickell, 2007; Causa, 2009; Berger and Heylen, 2011) have investigated the intensive 
margin in hours worked.  
 
Table 1. The patterns of weekly and annual hours worked in Eastern and Continental Europe 
 
Average usual weekly 
hours worked on the main job 
Average annual hours 
actually worked per worker 
  Eastern Europe Continental Europe Eastern Europe Continental Europe 
Estonia Hungary France Germany Estonia Hungary France Germany 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
2000 39.9 40.7 36.1 35.7 1,978 2,033 1,535 1,452 
2001 39.8 40.5 35.7 35.4 1,970 1,993 1,526 1,442 
2002 39.6 40.4 35.2 35.2 1,973 2,005 1,487 1,431 
2003 39.4 40.2 36.2 34.8 1,978 1,978 1,484 1,425 
2004 39.5 40.1 36.2 34.8 1,986 1,986 1,513 1,422 
2005 39.4 40.0 36.3 34.5 2,008 1,987 1,507 1,411 
2006 39.5 40.1 36.3 34.5 2,001 1,984 1,484 1,425 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
2007 39.4 40.0 36.4 34.4 1,998 1,979 1,500 1,424 
2008 39.4 39.9 36.6 34.5 1,968 1,982 1,507 1,418 
2009 38.7 39.6 36.5 34.6 1,831 1,963 1,489 1,373 
2010 38.7 39.6 36.5 34.6 1,875 1,958 1,494 1,390 
2011 38.7 39.3 36.6 34.6 1,919 1,976 1,496 1,393 
2012 38.7 39.3 36.5 34.6 1,886 1,889 1,490 1,375 
2013 38.8 39.4 36.2 34.4 1,866 1,880 1,474 1,362 
 
Source: OECD (2017a, b). 
 
In the light of this, our paper begins with the basic facts on the motivation to work across 
countries (Hungary, Estonia, Germany, France, and the United States). The paper provides an 
ample amount of evidence from both public finance and labor economics to draw certain 
conclusions. Numerous theoretical and empirical studies have identified a negative relation 
between tax rates (marginal and average) and labor supply (e.g., Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999; 
Blundell and Shephard, 2011; Meghir and Phillips, 2008). However, ‘labor supply’ is not the 
same as ‘the motivation to work’. It comprises a more general explanation in comparison with 
the motivation to work. When we discuss ‘work’, we mean work in the market, not work 
overall; unpaid home production is part of ‘non-working time’. Moreover, untaxed 
(‘underground’) sector of the economy, including tax avoidance and tax evasion activity, is 
considered as a ‘non-working time’. The simplification of this methodology has also been used 
by Lindbeck (1982) and Stuart (1981). In this way, our study will contain only ‘work versus 
leisure’ phenomena. 
Several interesting findings emerge in our paper, among them that differences in the 
motivation to work to tax-induced income changes are probably linked not only to the size of 
the average labor income tax rates or to the characteristics of the labor market (culture, 
unionization, labor market regulations, generous welfare systems, unemployment 
compensation programs, etc.), but also to other factors that have not yet been sufficiently 
explored. The primary finding of this paper is perhaps that people who are more balanced in 
their approach to life are both happier and take more leisure. But a more persuasive story is that 
the motivation to work has started to decline in Continental Europe, due to high levels of life 
satisfaction, while in Eastern Europe the motivation to work has started to increase because of 
low levels of life satisfaction. 
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we briefly discuss the recent 
literature in this area and then we develop theory and hypotheses. We then examine the data, 
including hours worked, average labor income tax rates, and life satisfaction. In the following 
section, we build an econometric model. The empirical results and interpretation section flows 
that, and presents quantitative findings. Finally, in the last section, we present our findings and 
conclusions. 
 
1. Literature review 
 
Recently, fervent arguments have been made in the United States and some European 
Union countries regarding taxation and labor supply. Most of the literature has focused on the 
impact of differences in labor market institutions. Blanchard and Summers (1986), Bentolila 
and Bertola (1990), and Blanchard and Jimeno (1995) have focused on the labor supply aspects 
of the role of institutions and labor market restrictions. Some empirical evidence suggests that 
the impact of unions, taxes, and employment protection can cause less the motivation to work 
(Nickell, 1977; Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2002; Nickell et al., 2003). However, Prescott (2002) 
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disputes that differential taxation by itself might cause the differences in the current level of 
aggregate hours worked.  
The first significant work was done by Prescott (2004) who calibrated a growth model 
to see the differences in the motivation to work between the United States and Europe. Prescott 
(2004) provided that different marginal tax rates explain the decreasing motivation to work in 
more advanced industrial countries. Prescott’s framework has been followed by numerous 
studies (e.g., Davis and Henrekson, 2003; Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2006; Ohanian et al., 2008; 
Chetty et al., 2011; McDaniel, 2011). His idea was defended by the statistical evidence of Davis 
and Henrekson (2003), who found that in wealthier countries higher tax rates reduce the 
motivation to work. Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2005) found that the impact of taxes on 
labor supply is negated by unionization management and labor market regulation. Ljungqvist 
and Sargent (2008) provided that unemployment benefits supplied by governments decrease 
the labor supply. Ohanian et al. (2008) apply Prescott’s methodology to a larger sample of 
countries over a longer time span and conclude that much of the change in hours worked over 
time and across countries can be explained by differences tax rates. Conesa and Kehoe (2008) 
empirically assessed taxes and productivity on the motivation to work in Spain. Their models 
showed that almost 80 percent of the decrease in the motivation to work can be explained by 
increasing taxes. Chen et al. (2015) contend that increases in labor taxes and unemployment 
benefits together explain roughly 75% of the declining the motivation to work in Europe relative 
to the United States over the past three decades. Using micro data from the European Social 
Survey, Mocan and Pogorelova (2015) tested the impact of “culture of leisure” and taxes 
(average and marginal) on the motivation to work of second-generation immigrants living in 
26 European countries. They found that both “culture of leisure” and taxes have an impact on 
females, but for men the only taxes have an impact on their motivation to work. The findings 
of Mocan and Pogorelova (2015) show that there is a significant difference between not only 
Americans and Europeans, but also between European countries. Therefore, we ground our 
predictions based on two country groups: Continental Europe (Germany, France) and Eastern 
Europe (Hungary, Estonia). 
 
2. Theory development and hypothesis 
 
High tax rates and its impact on the motivation to work is a very broad and 
interdisciplinary research area. It draws on works from economics, accounting, psychology, 
and sociology. The topic is of great interest to academics, policy makers, and private-sector 
institutions worldwide. Because we are introducing psychological and sociological theories in 
addition to economic theory, this research can make a seminal contribution in the areas of 
taxation and economics. 
To derive the empirical model, we follow theory of the leisure class presented by Veblen 
(1899), which presented individuals as irrational, economic agents who pursue social status and 
the prestige that comes from a place in society with little regard to their own satisfaction. 
Especially, Veblen (1899) criticized contemporary (19th-century) economic theories, and 
indicated that economists should take into account how individuals behave, socially and 
culturally, rather than rely upon the abstractions of theoretic deduction to explain the economic 
behavior of society (Veblen, 1899). On the other hand, in the national tax debate, many ignore 
the effect of taxes on human motivation (Harriss 1985). But, we know from Maslow’s 
Hierarchy of Needs that individuals must satisfy lower level basic needs before progressing on 
to meet higher-level growth needs (Maslow, 1954). Once lower basic needs have been 
reasonably satisfied, the importance of income decreases (Lewis, 1982). That is why both of 
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these theories are appealing in determining the differences of hours worked between these 
countries. Following from the above discussion, it is hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis: After controlling for differences in average labor income tax rates between 
the highest hours worked countries and the lowest hours worked countries, there is a significant 
negative association between the motivation to work and life satisfaction. 
 
3. Data: average labor income tax rates, life satisfaction and the motivation to work 
 
This section presents data on hours worked and the average labor income tax rates across 
countries. Life satisfaction measures are added to assess the true relationship between hours 
worked and average labor income tax rates from different perspectives. Our study will focus on 
the role of those three factors in determining whether it is taxes or life satisfaction that explains 
the differences in hours worked between these countries. 
 
3.1. Data on hours worked 
 
The main goal of this research is to investigate which policy can help clarify the 
motivation of employees to work. Employee motivation will be measured by the aggregate 
hours of work. For our example countries, the measure of aggregate hours of work will be the 
product of two numbers: civilian employment and annual hours of work per person in 
employment. This methodology was previously used by Ohanian et al. (2008). The employment 
and hours data are taken from the OECD Labor Statistics Database (OECD, 2017a, b). The 
sample of countries includes: France, Germany, Hungary, Estonia, and the United States. When 
we conduct our statistical analysis, the country sample reduces to 4 countries because we 
measure only differences among the highest hours worked countries (Hungary, Estonia) and 
the lowest hours worked countries (France, Germany). It is important to note that the hours data 
are meant to include differences in vacation and statutory holidays, as well as differences in the 
workweek (Rogerson, 2008). Because these four countries differ in population size, the data is 
normalized by the size of the population aged 15-65, which is used as a proxy for the number 
of working-aged individuals. The logic for this is that individuals under 15 are usually full-time 
students and individuals over the age of 65 are normally retired from market work. The 
normalization formula in shown in Equation (1): 
 
 64)-(15 Population)/  Employment*  employee)per    hours  ((Annual=H     (1) 
 
To simplify comparisons we report all values relative to the US in 2000-2013. Table 2 
indicates the resulting distribution of relative hours of work across countries. Examining 
Table 2 shows that there are considerable differences in hours worked across these four 
countries, with the lowest hours worked countries (France and Germany) working around 25% 
less than their counterparts in the US and the highest hours worked countries (Hungary and 
Estonia) working around 10% more than their counterparts in the US. 
 
Table 2. Hours worked relative to the US, 2000-2013 
 
Low ( < .8 ) High (  1.00 ) 
France (.74)  Hungary (1.10) 
Germany (.76) Estonia (1.09) 
 
Source: Authors’ own compilation. 
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3.2. Calculating average tax rates on labor income 
 
We know from previous neo-classical growth model studies that general taxes in the 
economy are divided into four categories: 1) consumption tax; 2) investment tax; 3) capital tax; 
and 4) labor income tax. The calculation of tax rates provided in this paper are only related to 
labor income. To be more precise, we shall concentrate on taxes on labor income paid by 
individuals. The other three taxes are excluded from our research because we want to focus on 
the average labor income tax rate and its impact on aggregate hours worked. It has been shown 
that individuals reduce their labor supply significantly more in response to an income tax than 
to an equivalent consumption tax (Blumkin et al., 2012). 
Here, this question can be raised among the readers ‘why we are using average labor tax 
rate’. Because, according to economic theory, income taxes affect the incentives to supply labor 
by lowering the real wage (Ohanian et al., 2008).  
According to economic theory, income taxes affect the incentives to supply labor by 
lowering the real wage (Ohanian et al., 2008). There are several different tax rates available to 
choose from when examining these questions, including statutory tax rates, marginal tax rates, 
and average tax rates. The complexity and diversity of tax exemptions, deductions, and credits 
make it nearly impossible for researchers to estimate the actual tax burden from information on 
statutory tax rates, making them unsuitable. Producing time-series and cross-country samples 
of marginal tax rates is limited by data availability. Therefore, we use average tax rates for labor 
income. A measure of average tax rates was developed by McDaniel (2007). Tax systems often 
include different forms of taxation that affect the same tax base. There are three widely used 
methods for deriving average tax rates. 
The first is usually referred to as an effective tax rate. Mendoza et al. (1994) computed 
the time series of effective tax rates on consumption, capital income, and labor income. They 
measured these tax rates for G7 countries using information from publicly available data 
sources. Mendoza et al. (1994) provide a method for calculating average tax rates that does not 
rely on data from individual tax returns or taxes paid by income bracket. The second method, 
developed by Prescott (2004), modifies the procedure of Mendoza et al. (1994) for producing 
the effective marginal tax rate on labor income. McDaniel (2007) developed the third method 
by producing a series for effective average tax rates on labor income that includes taxes levied 
on labor, payroll, and consumption for 15 OECD countries from the mid-1950s through the 
early 2000s. She found that the effective average labor tax rate is around 30% in the highest 
hours worked countries, while it is around 50% in the lowest hours worked countries. 
There are some differences in details among these three methodologies. McDaniel’s 
work builds upon the previous estimates of average tax rates across countries by Mendoza et 
al. (1994) and Prescott (2004). To obtain a correspondence from the actual tax systems to the 
taxes in the model, we utilize McDaniel’s method. Table 3 displays the data categories for tax 
revenues, domestic income, and private expenditures from OECD National Accounts (OECD, 
2017c) used to calculate tax rates from 2000 to 2013. 
 
Table 3. SNA 2000-2013 National Account Data 
 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
TPI Taxes on production and imports 
Sub Subsidies 
HHTL Taxes on income and profits (hh) 
SS Actual social contributions, receivable (gov) 
Note: ‘hh’ denotes a value comes from household accounts and ‘gov’ from government accounts. 
Source: McDaniel (2007). 
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The average tax rate on labor income  is obtained as in Equation (2): 
))()(1( SubTPIGDP
HHTSS Lh




    (2) 
Gollin (2002) found evidence regarding the labor share and that it is roughly constant over 
countries, in the range of 0.65 and 0.80. Therefore, we set . Following McDaniel 
(2007), we found that the effective average labor tax rate in the highest hours worked countries 
(Hungary, Estonia) and the lowest hours worked countries (France, Germany) is around 35-
40%, while the same rate is around 20-25% in the US, as shown in Table 6 in the Appendix. If 
the average labor tax rates are the same for both the highest and lowest hours worked countries, 
then an interesting research question is, “What is the key factor that can account for the 
differences in hours worked, if it is not differences in labor tax rates?” In the next section, we 
attempt to shed light on this question using data on life satisfaction. 
 
3.3. Isn’t life satisfaction a great thing? 
 
Life satisfaction measures how people evaluate their life as a whole rather than their current 
feelings. To measure life satisfaction we used data from Eurobarometer (EC, 2017). Subjects were 
asked, “On the whole are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied 
with the life you lead?” (EC, 2017). When asked to rate their general satisfaction with life on a scale 
from 0 to 10, people across the OECD gave it an average 6.6 response (EC, 2017). However, life 
satisfaction is not equally shared across the OECD. Some countries, including Estonia and Hungary, 
have a relatively low level of overall life satisfaction, with average scores of less than 5.6. At the 
other end of the scale, scores reach 7.0-7.5 in Germany and France. There is almost no difference 
in life satisfaction levels between men and women across OECD countries. 
 
3.4. Descriptive statistics 
 
The data used in the empirical tests includes four countries, Germany, France, Hungary, 
and Estonia for the 2000-2013 period by using annual data. Below, Table 4 tabulates descriptive 
statistics of the model variables.  
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of the variables  
 
Variable Obs. No. Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
Hours_work 40 1734.03 1872.00 1566.40 122.52 
Sat_index 40 2.790 3.160 2.280 0.259 
Labor_tax 40 0.369 0.390 0.354 0.012 
Rates 40 34.88 57.07 21.48 12.37 
Duration 40 0.515 0.830 0.310 0.164 
Density 40 12.89 22.20 5.100 5.534 
Protection 40 2.328 2.866 1.587 0.345 
Dummy 40 0.500 1.000 0.000 0.506 
Where: 𝐻𝑂𝑈𝑅𝑆𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐾𝐸𝐷 𝑡 denotes hours worked per employee at time t; 𝑆𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑡 denotes life satisfaction index 
at time t; 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 denotes labor income tax at time t; and 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌 is a binary variable takes the value 1 for 
the observations from the countries with low working hours (Germany and France), and 0 for those of the countries 
with high working hours (Hungary, and Estonia) 
Source: Authors’ own compilation. 
h
7.01 
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4. Model building 
 
Before choosing the empirical estimation method for the intended regression model, an 
order of integration of the variables should be examined by employing panel unit root tests. 
Here, two major points might be considered. First, the existence of a unit root problem with 
model variables should be tested with and without an intercept. Meanwhile, it is noteworthy to 
identify both the existence of individual and common unit root processes in panel series. To 
obtain more reliable and robust results several panel unit root tests are applied in this empirical 
research. This approach also enables us to address some methodological issues not considered 
in previous studies (Hasanov et al., 2017).  
More precisely, we use Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002), Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003), 
Breitung (2000) as well as Fisher-ADF and Fisher-PP panel unit root tests of Maddala and Wu 
(1999). Note that Levin, Lin, and Chu (hereafter LLC) and Breitung assume a common unit 
root process while Im, Pesaran and Shin (hereafter IPS), Fisher-ADF and Fisher-PP tests 
assume the individual unit root process in panel data series. Test results provide useful 
information about the integration properties of the data employed in this research.  
To estimate the responsiveness of hours worked per employee to life satisfaction and 
labor income tax rates, we first employ a panel multiple linear regression model as in equation 
(3), and second we employ an impulse response analysis based on an unrestricted Vector 
Autoregressive (VAR) model as in equation (4) below: 
 
tti
i
i iTAX
TAXINDEXINDEXWORKED
XDUMMYLABOR
LABORDUMMYSATSATHOURSLog
t
tttt






 ,
4
`4
3210)(
  (3) 
  
and  
 
 tti
i
i i
TAXINDEXWORKEDWORKED
X
LABORSATHOURSLogHOURSLog
tttt








,
4
1
3210 111
)()(
(4)
 
 
Here, 𝐻𝑂𝑈𝑅𝑆𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐾𝐸𝐷𝑡 , 𝑆𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑡 , and 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡  are as defined previously (see 
Table 4). 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 covers all institutional variables (benefit replacement rates, unemployment benefit 
duration, net union density, and employment protection) added to the model to control such 
effects. Institutional variables used in our regressions are taken from the Database for 
Institutional Comparisons in Europe (DICE, 2017) (for more information, see Appendix B). The 
error terms are denoted as  𝜗𝑡 and  𝜀𝑡, respectively. 
 
5. Empirical results and interpretation 
 
5.1. Unit root test results 
 
Table 5 represents panel unit test results for all variables included, with intercept 
(panel A), and with the trend and intercept (panel B). Assuming the common unit root process, 
LLC concludes that hours_work, labor_tax, and density are I(0) or stationary at level while the 
trend is not included. Fisher-ADF, Fisher-PP, and IPS do not reveal any individual unit root 
process in hours_work, and labor_tax, giving conflicting results. However, at least one test 
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rejects the existence of unit root at a 5% significance level in all variables, except rates and 
protection.  
When the trend is included, LLC test results reject a common unit root process in all 
variables, except duration. Breitung test reveals weak stationarity, but finds duration I(0) at the 
5% significance level. To test de-trended individual unit root process, only Fisher-PP unit root 
test reveals duration I(0) while protection is found as not stationary at level. For other variables, 
the existence of an individual unit root process is mostly rejected.  
Overall evaluation of unit root tests is that only duration and protection are weak 
stationary at the level when the series are de-trended. Note that in Nadirov and Aliyev (2016), 
the impact of both duration and protection over hours_work is not statistically significant. To 
overcome this issue, here, we decide to run empirical estimations with as well as without these 
two variables to obtain results that are more reliable. 
 
Table 5. Panel unit root test results 
 
Panel A: Individual Intercept 
 LLC Breitung Fisher-ADF Fisher-PP IPS 
I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
Hours_work -6.237*** - 21.159*** 15.082** -2.314** 
Sat_index -0.799 - 12.990* 23.817*** -0.863 
Labor_tax -7.726*** - 22.777*** 16.660** -2.783*** 
Rates -0.317 - 10.815 12.812* 0.013 
Duration 7.386 - 5.674 20.771*** -0.628 
Density -5.573*** - 16.404** 4.775 -1.359* 
Protection -0.120 - 1.389 1.837 0.583 
Panel B: Individual Intercept and Trend 
Hours_work -28.939*** -1.450* 24.699*** 10.468 -4.075*** 
Sat_index -2.9900*** -1.144 13.587* 35.695*** -0.509 
Labor_tax -13.292*** -1.295* 33.728*** 28.194*** -2.786*** 
Rates -2.937*** -2.290** 13.921* 16.448** -0.524 
Duration 21.340 -1.542** 2.445 18.669*** 0.257 
Density -89.349*** -1.445* 25.738*** 21.264*** -12.534*** 
Protection -0.815 -1.696** 2.165 1.845 0.241 
Note: ***, **, and * denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
Probabilities of Fisher-ADF and Fisher-PP are computed by using an asymptotic χ2 distribution while all the rest 
of the tests assume asymptotic normality. Maximum lag length set to two and optimal length is specified 
automatically by Schwarz (SC) criterion. 
 
5.2. Panel OLS regression results  
 
Table 5 tabulates panel OLS regression results obtained from the estimation of equation 
(2) in two different modifications. More precisely, two institutional variables (duration and 
protection) are not included in the panel regression in model (2) while both are added to the 
estimated model (1). It is noteworthy once to emphasize that dummy is a binary variable 
included to differentiate the impact of sat_index and labor_tax to the hours_work for the low-
and-high working hour countries.  
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Table 5. Panel OLS regression results 
 
Independent variables Model (1) Model (2) 
Sat_index 
0.0889*** 
(0.0155) 
0.0807*** 
(0.0102) 
Sat_index*dummy 
-0.1187*** 
(0.0297) 
-0.1153*** 
(0.0289) 
Labor_tax 
0.2248 
(0.2298) 
0.2717 
(0.2161) 
Labor_tax*dummy 
0.6037*** 
(0.2654) 
0.5794*** 
(0.2590) 
Log(Rates) 
-0.0511* 
(0.0291) 
-0.0571** 
(0.0233) 
Log(Duration) 
-0.0064 
(0.0261) 
- 
Log(Density) 
0.0286*** 
(0.0062) 
0.0264*** 
(0.0055) 
Log(Protection) 
-0.0137 
(0.0135) 
- 
C 
7.3052*** 
(0.1861) 
7.3299*** 
(0.1412) 
R-squared 0.9903 0.9900 
S.E. of regression 0.0078 0.0077 
No. of obs.  40 40 
Note: The dependent variable is log (hours_work). ***, **, and * denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 
1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Standard errors for each coefficient are given in parentheses.  
 
Comparing the estimation results in model (1) and model (2) shows no significant 
impact of excluding duration and protection. Thus, this exclusion does not lead to any 
statistically significant changes as well as too small of magnitude differences for regression 
coefficients. Meanwhile, the coefficients of both institutional variables are neither statistically, 
nor economically, significant as in Nadirov and Aliyev (2016).  
Empirical estimations indicate that the impact of sat_index over working hours is 
statistically significant for both groups, but positive in countries with high working hours while 
the association is negative in those with low working hours according to our sample. More 
precisely, in the case of Hungary and Estonia, the average impact of a one unit positive change 
in sat_index increases working hours by 8.07-8.89% while other variables are assumed to 
remain the same. For Germany and France, the impact is negative ((0.0889-0.1187)*100% =    
-2.98% for the model (1), and (0.0807-0.1153)*100% = 3.46%) for model (2). 
For the impact of labor_tax, for high working hour countries, a 1% or 0.01 point increase 
leads to 0.22-0.27% more work1. This impact is significantly higher for countries with low 
working hours (0.6037%-0.2248% = 0.3789% for model (1), and 0.5794%-0.2717% = 0.3077% 
for model (2)). For institutional variables, estimation results reveal a statistically significant 
negative influence of rates and a positive impact of density. The remaining two institutional 
variables (duration and protection) do not significantly matter for the motivation to work.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1Note that labor income tax gets a value between 0 and 1. Here, 1 point means 0.01. That is why in 
interpretation we calculate, ceteris paribus, the impact as 0.2248*0.01*100%.  
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5.3. Impulse response analysis 
 
Because all variables are I(0), we can run unrestricted VAR to obtain impulse-response 
simulation results. Note that only hours_work, labor_tax, and sat_index are included as 
endogenous variables while institutional variables are employed as exogenous. Meanwhile, a 
binary variable is also added to the exogenous factors in order to control for working hours 
difference between the two groups.  
Simulation findings are refined and support our expectations as well as are in accordance 
with the panel OLS results (see Figure 1, below). Simulations reveal a positive response in 
hours worked per employee to one standard deviation in labor income taxation in both cases. 
Including duration and protection does not significantly matter for this relationship. However, 
the same inference cannot be made in case of the satisfaction index and hours worked per 
employee. When the two institutional variables are included in the VAR specification as 
exogenous factors, the response of work hour per employee to one standard deviation in 
satisfaction index is negative. When duration and protection are not added, no significant 
response is observed. These findings are plausible as we found a negative relationship for low 
working hour countries in panel OLS estimations.  
 
 
a) While including duration and protection as exogenous variables 
 
 
b) Duration and protection are not added to the exogenous variables list. 
 
Figure 1. Impulse-response simulations. 
Note: Simulation results are obtained from unrestricted VAR estimation with one lag. There is not autocorrelation 
problem in residuals according to LM test results.  
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this article, we argue that an empirical approach to the relationship between taxes and 
the motivation to work should take into account the distinction between the highest hours 
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worked countries and the lowest hours worked countries to help generate significant insights. 
To test this conjecture, we constructed both impulse response analysis based on unrestricted 
Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model and a panel multiple linear regression model in which 
countries with high working hours and low working hours enter as separate factors into the 
process. The econometric model was estimated and tested for four countries (Hungary, Estonia, 
Germany, and France) over the period 2000-2013. The primary points from these models can 
be summarized as follows. Increases in life satisfaction exert negative effects on working hours 
in countries with low working hours, while it has a positive effect on working hours in countries 
with high working hours. This suggests that the effect of average labor income tax rates on the 
motivation to work can be assessed differently for societies who are working for normal living 
standards and societies who are working for social status or other luxury items. For future 
research, our idea can be tested with poor and rich countries instead of using the classification 
of countries with high and low working hours. While people in poor countries might have lower 
life satisfaction, people in rich countries might have greater life satisfaction; this approach can 
help us to see how people in rich countries behave compared to people in poor countries when 
average labor income tax rate changes. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A. 
 
Table 6. Average Tax on Labor, τh 
 
Years Estonia France Germany Hungary United States 
2000 0.359 0.363 0.385 0.390 0.239 
2001 0.362 0.360 0.380 0.374 0.237 
2002 0.356 0.354 0.379 0.370 0.215 
2003 0.355 0.356 0.379 0.368 0.205 
2004 0.358 0.363 0.381 0.365 0.238 
2005 0.363 0.361 0.380 0.386 0.236 
2006 0.358 0.355 0.383 0.384 0.215 
2007 0.360 0.354 0.382 0.382 0.210 
2008 0.359 0.361 0.385 0.390 0.240 
2009 0.364 0.360 0.382 0.388 0.242 
2010 0.358 0.359 0.381 0.380 0.239 
2011 0.361 0.357 0.379 0.383 0.243 
2012 0.359 0.362 0.388 0.396 0.241 
2013 0.363 0.360 0.386 0.388 0.238 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
 
Appendix B.  
 
Table 7. Institutional variables 
 
• Employment protection. This variable is higher the stricter the employment protection legislation, with a 
range {0,2}.  
• Net union density. This variable measures the fraction of workers that were union members over the 
sample period covered.  
• Benefit replacement rates. This variable measures the percentage of (average before tax) earnings 
covered through unemployment and social insurance programs.  
• Benefit duration. This variable is a proxy for the duration of unemployment benefit specified above. A 
value of zero indicates that the unemployment benefit provision stops within the first year. A value of one 
indicates that unemployed receive the amount defined in BRR for five years. 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on Ohanian et al., 2008. 
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